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When do R&D subsidies boost innovation? 
Revisiting the inverted U-shape 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 10/2007 
Juha Kilponen – Torsten Santavirta 




We show theoretically that a proportional R&D subsidy accelerates innovation 
activity at all degrees of competition in the modern Schumpeterian growth model, 
but less so at high degrees of competition. We then use company-level data on 
patenting activity, product market competition and R&D subsidies of Finnish 
firms during 1990–2001 to test the theoretical prediction. The empirical findings 
can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we find relatively strong evidence in 
favour of the inverted U-shape between competition and innovation. Secondly, we 
find some evidence that a direct R&D subsidy increases innovative activity at all 
but very high degrees of competition. This can be interpreted so mean that the 
R&D subsidy reinforces the Schumpeterian effect due to the negative cross-effect 
of R&D subsidy and competition. This is evident from the finding that an increase 
in the R&D subsidy steepens the inverted U relationship when competition is 
fierce. 
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Lisäävätkö T&K-tuet innovaatioita? – 
Tarkasteluja käänteisen U-käyrän valossa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 10/2007 
Juha Kilponen – Torsten Santavirta 




Tutkimus- ja kehitystoimintaan suunnatulla suhteellisella julkisella tuella on posi-
tiivinen vaikutus innovaatioihin, mutta T&K-tuen vaikutus vaimenee hyödyke-
markkinakilpailun kiristyessä teoreettisessa schumpeteriläisessä kasvumallissa. 
Tässä artikkelissa esitetyt empiiriset tulokset, jotka perustuvat suomalaiseen 
yritystason aineistoon patenteista, hyödykemarkkinoiden kilpailullisuudesta ja 
T&K-tuista vuosina 1990–2001, pääosin tukevat tätä tulosta. Empiiriset tulokset 
osoittavat myös, että kilpailun ja innovaatioiden väliselle käänteiselle U-käyrälle 
löytyy tilastollisesti varsin merkitsevää näyttöä. Näiden tulosten valossa voidaan 
todeta, että T&K-tuet voimistavat niin sanottua Schumpeteriläistä vaikutusta inno-
vaatioihin. Tämä tulee esille kilpailun ja T&K-tuen negatiivisesta ristikkäis-
vaikutuksesta, jonka seurauksena yrityksille suunnatun suhteellisen T&K-tuen 
lisäys voimistaa kiristyvän kilpailun kielteisiä vaikutuksia innovaatioihin hyvin 
tiukan kilpailun hyödykemarkkinoilla. 
 
Avainsanat: kilpailu, innovaatiot, T&K-tuki, patentit 
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Modern growth theory emphasises the incentive eﬀects of product market
competition on ﬁrms’ innovative activities. More intense product market
competition (PMC) stimulates innovation activities through the change in
the diﬀerence between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents. In other
words, although not increasing post innovation rents per se, competition
may increase the incremental proﬁts from innovating and thereby encourage
R & Di n v e s t m e n t .T h i si si nc o n t r a s tt oS c h u m p e t e r ’ s( 1 9 3 4 )p r e d i c t i o nt h a t
competition decreases the incentives to innovate, simply because it drives down
ﬁrms’ prospects for rents from innovating. Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997)
and Aghion et al (2001) combine these two eﬀects into one coherent theory
and show that the relationship between competition and innovation has an
inverted-U shape. In their model, the inverted-U shape results from the
interplay between the escape-from-competition-eﬀe c ta n dt h eS c h u m p e t e r i a n
eﬀect.
In this paper we introduce R&D subsidies1 into the model of Aghion et
al (2001). We let R&D subsidies to decrease proportionally the costs of
innovating and thus alter the diﬀerence between post- and pre-innovation rents.
It turns out that R&D subsidies accelerate innovation at diﬀerent degrees of
competition, but this eﬀect becomes smaller when competition is ﬁerce. This
is primarily due to strategic substitutability eﬀect. It states that any factor
— such as R&D subsidy — which increases the innovation of the neck-and-neck
ﬁrm decreases the innovation of the follower ﬁrm. We show that as competition
becomes more intense, this strategic substitutability eﬀect becomes stronger.
This is conﬁrmed by the numerical simulation of the model. Simulations show
that at high level of competition, inverted-U shape becomes steeper when
R&D subsidies are higher. Otherwise, R&D subsidies leave the shape of the
relationship between competition and innovation intact.
In order to test these hypotheses, we extend the empirical approach
of Aghion et al (2005) by allowing for interaction between R&D subsidies
and competition. We use ﬁrm and plant level data on patenting activity,
product market competition and R&D subsidies granted for the Finnish ﬁrms
over the period 1990—2001. We claim that the Finnish case suits very well
to our empirical exercise. Namely, the European integration process and
severe recession in 1990—1992 speed up product markets’ liberalization and
privatization of publicly owned companies. In particular, opening up of the
product markets to foreign competition was felt heavily in the Finnish ﬁrms,
forcing them to increase their productivity and competitiveness. Moreover,
around the same time, competition policy became a recognized policy tool
along with the founding of the national competition authority in 1988. R&D
subsidies also played an important role in restructuring of the Finnish industry
from a production of low-tech to high-tech products. This was reﬂected
through the creation of Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation
1There is still an ongoing debate whether the public sector’s intervention at the research
and development markets creates additionality in the sense of boosting the private ﬁrms’
innovative activities. See for instance David, Hall and Toole (2000) for a survey on this
literature.
7(Tekes) in 1983 and rapid increase of R&D funding since early 1990s.
Since its founding, Tekes has directed a major part of public R&D subsidies
to the ﬁrms. These subsidies form a cornerstone of Tekes’ funding, being
roughly 40% of its total budget. Our measure of the public R&D support
used in the empirical analysis correspond to these Tekes’ R&D subsidies.
Finally, we complete the data with the case-by-case investigations of potential
distortions of competition by the Finnish competition authority, and a set of
privatization decisions. They are used as quasi-natural experiment to remove
the endogeneity problem associated to our competition measure, as in Aghion
et al (2005).
Our empirical ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd
empirical evidence in favor of the inverted-U shape between innovation and
competition. This result supports the ﬁndings of Aghion et al (2005) who
also ﬁnd the inverted-U shape using the data on stock listed ﬁrms in the
UK. Second, in line with our theoretical prediction, we ﬁnd evidence that
direct R&D subsidies increase innovation. However, the positive eﬀect of R&D
subsidies to innovation is smaller when competition becomes more intense. This
is due to the negative cross-eﬀect of innovation and competition found in the
data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents analytically
the model of Aghion et al (2001) and develops the extensions to the model.
Section 3 provides a description of the data and discusses which variables
are best suited for measuring their theoretical counterparts developed in the
previous section. Section 4 outlines the empirical methods used. Section 5
provides the empirical results and ﬁnally section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical issues of competition and innovation
In this paper, we focus on a speciﬁc model of Aghion et al (2001), henceforth,
for convenience, AHHV. Their model gives a theoretical rationale for an
inverted-U relationship between degree of product market competition and
rate of innovation. The innovation process is assumed to be of a ‘step-by-step’
character, where the follower in any industry must ﬁrst catch up with the
technological leader before being able to become a leader itself. In contrast to
Schumpeterian growth models, the incumbent ﬁrm may also innovate in this
model.
From this it follows, that innovation incentives depend more on the
diﬀerence between post-innovation rents and pre-innovation rents than upon
post-innovation rents per se. In particular, more intense product market
competition (PMC) may stimulate ﬁrms’ innovative activities because it
may reduce the ﬁrms’ pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces their
post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the
incremental proﬁts from innovating and thereby encourage R&D investment.
This is in sharp contrast to the Schumpeterian prediction.2
2The theoretical framework and the mathematical formalization presented in this section
is that of Aghion et al (1997, 2001) except where explicitly mentioned or ascribed to others.
82.1 The basic model
AHHV formalize a step-by-step technological progress making use of a model of
dynamic competition between two ﬁrms originally formalized by Budd, Harris
and Vickers (1993). Their solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium
in Markov strategies. Each ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort depends only on its current
technological state (ie on whether the ﬁrm is a leader, a follower or has equal
technology as the competitor), and not on the ﬁrm, on the industry to which
the ﬁrm belongs or the time.
In the basic model ﬁnal output in period t, yt, is obtained by aggregating




where each industry i is duopolistic with respect to both production and
research activities, with ﬁrms A and B. The production technology is of the








where qAi and qBi denote the output of ﬁrm A and B respectively.
Competition is measured using the elasticity of substitution parameter α ∈
[0,1] and the demand functions for the intermediate goods can be derived by
optimizing (2.2) subject to the budget constraint pAiqAi + pBiqBi =1 .3 From
this maximization problem it follows that the demand functions facing the two



























Accordingly, the elasticity of demand that each intermediate inputs producing
ﬁrm j in industry i faces is ηj =
(1−αλj)
(1−α) ,w h e r eλj = pjqj is the revenue of the













,j = A,B. (2.5)
Consequently, under Bertrand competition the equilibrium price of the inputs







cj, j = A,B, (2.6)
3The wage rate is normalized to unity.





λj (1 − α)
1 − αλj
,j = A,B. (2.7)
Equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) can be solved for unique equilibrium revenues,
prices and proﬁts. Given the degree of substitutability α equilibrium proﬁts
of each ﬁrm j are determined by its relative production costs, ie by the ratio
of ﬁrm j’s unit production costs cj to the corresponding costs of the other
ﬁrm c−j,z=
cj
c−j. The relative production cost z is calculated by dividing the
u n i tp r o d u c t i o nc o s to fﬁrm j by the unit production cost of the other ﬁrm
−j,i ez =
cj
c−j. This implies that, the industry demand being unit elastic, an
equiproportional reduction in both cA and cB would induce the ﬁrms to adjust
t h ep r i c ei nt h es a m ep r o p o r t i o nw i t h o u ta ﬀecting the degree of competition
and hence not ﬁrm’s revenues and proﬁts. Consequently, only a change in















are therefore implicitly deﬁned by (2.5)—(2.7). The substitutability parameter
α in the proﬁt function (2.7) corresponds to the standard measures of
competition and can be used to parameterize the degree of competition within
each industry. This can also be motived by the arguments of Boone (2000).
Namely, he points out that any parameter positively aﬀecting the proﬁtability
of having lower unit production costs or products of better quality than other
ﬁr m si sas u i t a b l em e a s u r eo fp r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o n .
In the model labour is the only input employed by ﬁrms producing
according to a constant-returns production function. Further, wage rate is
taken as given leading to the unit costs of production cA and cB of the two ﬁrms
in the industry being independent of the quantities produced. The technology
level of a duopoly ﬁrm in a given industry is denoted as k. In order to produce
one unit of the intermediate good, this ﬁrm needs to employ γ−k units of labor,
where γ>1 is a parameter that measures the size of a leading-edge innovation.
The state of an industry is thus fully characterized by a pair of integers (l,m),
where l is the leader’s technology and m is the technology gap of the leader
over the follower (m =0when the ﬁrms are neck-and-neck). The equilibrium
proﬁt ﬂow πm (resp. π−m)o faﬁrm m steps ahead (resp. behind) of its rival
depends on the size of the gap m.4
AHHV derive the following Bellman equations that depict the annuity
value Vj, j = m,0,−m, of being a technological leader (in an industry with a
technology gap m,an e c k - a n d - n e c kﬁrm (both ﬁr m sh a v ee q u a lt e c h n o l o g i e s ) ,
4The logarithmic ﬁnal good technology, together with the nonlinear production cost
structure c(x)=x · γ−k imply that the equilibrium proﬁt ﬂows of the leader and the
follower in an industry depend on only the technological gap m between them, not on their
absolute technology levels.
10or a follower:
rVm = πm + xm (Vm+1 − Vm)+( x−m + h)(Vm−1 − Vm) −
wβ(xm)2
2
rV−m = π−m + xm(V−m−1 − V−m)+( x−m + h)(V−m+1 − V−m) −
wβ(x−m)2
2







Here w denotes the wage rate,
wβ(x)2
2 the R&D cost function of a ﬁrm
performing R&D, and moving one technological step ahead with a Poisson
hazard rate x, h is a help factor that characterize the ease of imitation of
the follower, and r denotes the individual rate of time preference. In words,
the annuity value of currently being a leader in an industry with gap m at
date t equals the current ﬂow πm minus the current R&D cost
wβ(x)2
2 plus the
discounted expected capital gain xm (Vm+1 − Vm) from making an innovation
and thereby moving one further step ahead of the follower, minus the expected
capital loss (x−m + h)(Vm−1 − Vm) from having the follower catch up by one
step with the leader. The equations for the annuity value of the follower
and neck-and-neck ﬁrm are similarly explained. Notice though, that in the
B e l l m a ne q u a t i o nf o rt h en e c k - a n d - n e c kﬁr mt h e r ei sn oh e l pf a c t o rh because
the lack of a leader. Also in symmetric Nash equilibrium both neck-and-neck
ﬁrms’ R&D intensities are equal. Now, using the fact that each ﬁrm uses its
own R&D intensity to maximize its current value, ie to maximize the RHS of
the corresponding Bellman equation, the following ﬁrst order conditions are
obtained
βwxm = Vm+1 − Vm; (2.10)
βwx−m = V−(m−1) − V−m; (2.11)
βwx0 = V1 − V0. (2.12)
2 . 2 O n e - s t e pc a s ew i t ha nR & Ds u b s i d y
AHHV also discuss a case where the size of the innovation γ is very large and
the leaders do not conduct R&D. In this case, the length of a lead cannot be
greater than one innovation. AHHV show that when γ −→ ∞, the equilibrium
level of R&D eﬀort of the leading ﬁrm will approach zero. When γ is very large,
even a one-step lead would raise the leader’s proﬁta l m o s tt ot h em a x i m a ll e v e l
(φ(γ−1,α) ' 1 for α ≥ 0), and thus the incentive to innovate would decrease.
This greatly simpliﬁes the AHHV model and allows the results to be derived
analytically. The one-step case of AHHV developed in the remainder of this
section is re-formulated only to the extent that we introduce a wage subsidy
f o rR & Da c t i v i t y .T h i si sd o n ei no r d e rt oa n a l y s eh o waw a g es u b s i d yt oR & D
interacts with competition.
In the one-step case, the maximum technological gap between leader and
follower in an industry is m =1 . In this case, the ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort is xm,
where m ∈ (−1,0,1) and the expected present value of the proﬁti sd e n o t e d
V−1 ,V0 and V1 respectively for a follower ﬁrm, neck-and-neck ﬁrm, and leader
11in an industry. The labour supply is perfectly elastic allowing for taking the
wage rate as given and normalizing it to unity (β = w =1 ) . There is no help
factor for the followers (h =0 ). Let ρ ∈ (0,1) denote a direct R&D subsidy
which reduces the costs of innovating proportionally to the R&D costs x2
m/2.
The Bellman equations for equilibrium R&D investments can then be written
as
rV1 = π1 +( x−1)(V0 − V1)










In the above equations, (1 − ρ) can be interpreted as the ﬁrm’s own share of
its R&D costs, while ρ is a direct proportional subsidy. Using the fact that
the technological leader’s incentives to invest in R&D are driven down to zero




=( V1 − V0) − (1 − ρ)x0 =0 (2.14)
∂rV−1
∂x−1
=( V0 − V−1) − (1 − ρ)x−1 =0 . (2.15)
Consequently, the innovation probabilities of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm and the
follower are
x0 = −r +
q¡
r2 +2( 1− ρ)
−1 (π1 − π0)
¢
(2.16)
x−1 = −(r + x0)+
q
r2 + x2
0 +2( 1− ρ)
−1 (π1 − π−1) (2.17)
When examining the eﬀects of competition on the innovation probability
in the one-step case, Aghion et al (2005) assume that a reduction in the
neck-and-neck proﬁts π0 represents intensiﬁed product market competition.5
Aghion et al (2005) argue that the analysis and the results in the one-step case
can be replicated parameterizing competition by the elasticity parameter, α.
Equations (2.16) and (2.17)imply that intensiﬁed product market competition,
as characterized by a fall in the neck-and-neck proﬁts π0 will lead to an increase
in the R&D eﬀort of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm, x0. The follower will decrease its
R&D eﬀort x−1 as the PMC is intensiﬁed. This opposing behavior of the
neck-and-neck ﬁrm and the follower, in regard to R&D eﬀorts, resulting from
intensiﬁed PMC, is explained by two diﬀerent eﬀects.
As for the decrease in R&D eﬀort of a follower x−1. Aghion et al (2005)
argue that this is the basic Schumpeterian eﬀect at work, resulting from the
reduced prospective rent of the successful innovator (π0−π−1), which manages
5For simplicity it is assumed that π−1 and π1 are unaﬀected by a change in
competitiveness. According to Aghion and Howitt (1998) the analysis remains essentially
unmodiﬁed also for cases where π1 is increased and π−1 r e d u c e db ya ni n c r e a s ei n
competition.
12to catch up with its rival. More intense competition induces a neck-and-neck
ﬁrm to innovate, in order to escape competition. Thus, these ﬁrms increase
their innovative activity, so that x0 increases. This is because, as the diﬀerence
in proﬁts between being a leader and being a neck-and-neck ﬁrm (π1 − π0)
increases (π0 falls and π1 remains unchanged), the incremental value of getting
ahead increases with intensiﬁed PMC. Aghion et al (2005) refer to this eﬀect
as the escape competition eﬀect. The sum of these eﬀects is that the higher the
fraction of neck-and-neck sectors in the economy, the more positive the eﬀect
of intensiﬁed PMC on the average innovation rate.
2.2.1 Competition and innovation
The aggregate eﬀect of intensiﬁed product market competition on the
steady-state innovation rate is ambiguous, because of its diﬀerent eﬀects on
industries in leveled (neck-and-neck) and unleveled (leader-follower) states.
The overall eﬀect on average productivity growth depends on the time a sector
spends being neck-and-neck in the steady-state. This is formulated by letting
μ1 and μ0 respectively denote the steady-state probability of being unleveled
and leveled. During any unit time interval an unleveled sector can become
leveled with a steady-state probability, μ1x−1. Furthermore, the probability of
a leveled sector becoming unleveled is 2μ0x0, which is the aggregate probability
of one of the ﬁrms innovating when both ﬁrms try to escape competition. In
the steady-state these two probabilities must be equal
μ1x−1 =2 μ0x0, (2.18)
since the fraction of sectors in each state must remain unchanged. Combining
(2.18) with the fact that the fractions of unleveled and leveled sectors sum up









and further the average rate of innovation




Aghion et al (2005) show by numerical simulations of the model, that the
relation between product market competition and the innovation rate, I,
follows an inverted-U shaped pattern.
2.2.2 Inverted-U relationship
An inverted-U relationship is obtained between PMC and the average
innovation rate.6 From the analysis of how intensiﬁed competition aﬀects
6An early contribution concluding that arrives to the result that some intermediate degree
of rivalry is most conducive to technological advance is Kamien and Schwartz (1974).
13the average innovation rate, it follows that, when competition is initially low,
intensiﬁed competition may raise the rate of innovation through the escape
from the competition eﬀect on neck-and-neck ﬁrms. When competition is
already ﬁerce, the Schumpeterian eﬀect may decrease the innovation rate, by
decreasing the followers’ incentive to innovate. The inverted-U shaped pattern
between competition and innovation results from the interplay between the
escape competition and the Schumpeterian eﬀects. The reason why one eﬀect
is stronger for low degrees of competition, whereas the other dominates for
high degrees, is due to the composition eﬀect on the steady state distribution
of leveled and unleveled industries.
The composition eﬀect can be seen more clearly from the steady state
distribution of the fraction of industries in the leveled state and the unleveled
state in equation (2.19). When there is no competition (π0 = π1),i ti sc l e a r
from equation (2.16) that x0 =0 , and thus the industry is always leveled (μ0 =
1 in (2.19)). Under perfect competition (π0 = π−1), (2.16) and (2.17) imply
that neck-and-neck R&D eﬀorts will be larger than followers’ R&D eﬀorts,
x0 >x −1. Thus, the overall rate of innovation is at least twice as high in the
leveled state as in the unleveled state. Hence the fraction of time μ1 spent in
the leveled state is less than 1/3 under perfect competition.
At low levels of PMC, most sectors will be leveled, and the escape
competition eﬀect dominates on average, whereas at high levels of PMC, most
sectors will be unleveled, and the Schumpeterian eﬀect on followers’ R&D
eﬀorts dominates on average. This in turn implies that intensiﬁed PMC will
have a positive eﬀect on innovative activity at low initial levels of PMC and a
negative eﬀect at high initial levels of PMC.
2.3 Innovation and direct R&D subsidies
2.3.1 Individual industries
In order to see how a proportional R&D subsidy aﬀects incentives to innovate




In other words, when neck-and-neck ﬁr m sc h oo s et h e i rR & De ﬀort x0 optimally,
they only take into account their own R&D investment, as the rivals eﬀort
equals x0 in a symmetric Markov equilibrium. Important strategic interaction,
h o w e v e r ,a r i s e sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h ei n n o v a t i v ea c t i v i t yo ft h ef o l l o w e ri s
aﬀected by the responses of the neck-and-neck ﬁr m .I nf a c t ,i tc a nb es h o w n





x−1 + r + x0
< 0. (2.22)
Given that the derivative ∂x−1/∂x0 is negative, there is a strategic
substitutability between the innovative activity of the follower and that of
14the neck-and-neck ﬁrm: any factor that increases t h ei n n o v a t i v ea c t i v i t yo f
the neck-and-neck ﬁrm, will decrease the innovative activity of the follower.
Moreover, looking at ∂x−1/∂x0 from a partial equilibrium perspective, we can
see that strategic substitutability is ‘strongest’ when the innovative activity of
the neck-and-neck ﬁrm x0 is very small. In fact, it can easily be seen that
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂x−1
∂x0
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x0→0
→ 1 (2.23)
On the contrary, as x0 starts to deviate from zero, we ﬁnd that the strategic




for all realistic values of the proﬁtd i ﬀerence (π1 − π0). In other words,
an increase in the R&D subsidy will always increase the R&D eﬀort of a
neck-and-neck ﬁrm x0. I nt h ec a s eo ft h ef o l l o w e r ,h o w e v e r ,t h ee ﬀect is more
complicated, precisely because of the strategic substitutability. By direct
















Given that the partial derivatives on the right hand side are of opposite sign,
the eﬀect of direct R&D subsidy on the followers incentives to innovate remains
ambiguous. The strategic substitutability factor
∂x−1
∂x0 plays here obviously an
i m p o r t a n tr o l e .W h e nt h e r ei sn oc o m p e t i t i o n ,w ek n o wt h a tx0 → 0 and thus
the follower’s response to R&D subsidies depend solely on the direct eﬀect
∂x−1
∂ρ . Thus, it is clear that the direct R&D subsidy will have a positive eﬀect
on the follower’s innovating activity when the degree of competition is low. As
competition gets more ﬁerce and x0 > 0 the sign of (2.25) becomes ambiguous.











Condition (2.26) needs to be interpreted at the model’s equilibrium. It is solely
an implicit condition, given that the left hand side still depends upon proﬁts.
As competition is getting more intense (π0 → π−1)w ek n o wt h a t
π1−π−1
π1−π0 → 1.
Moreover, we know from above that the neck-and-neck ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort will
be larger than the follower’s, ie x0 >x −1, when product market competition is
ﬁerce. Consequently, condition (2.26) still holds at high levels of competition.
This means that the R&D subsidy increases the followers innovative activity
also at high levels of competition. However according to 2.25, it is still clear





starts moderating the direct
eﬀect of an R&D subsidy when competition becomes tougher.
152.4 Average innovation rate and R&D subsidy
Until know, we have derived the result that R&D subsidy aﬀects positively
both the neck-and-neck ﬁrms’ and the followers’ incentives to innovate at
low and high levels of competition. We have also shown that the strategic
substitutability eﬀect moderates the direct eﬀect of an R&D subsidy when
competition becomes harder. However, the overall eﬀect of R&D subsidy needs
still to be analyzed by taking into account that the degree of competition
has a dynamic eﬀect determining the steady state distribution of leveled and
unleveled industries in the economy (see section 2.2.2).
We rely here on numerical simulations, which enable us to examine the
eﬀects of direct R&D subsidy on incentives to innovate in the world located
between monopoly and perfect competition. Figure 1 depicts the average
innovation rate at diﬀerent degrees of competition as well as at three diﬀerent
levels of R&D subsidy (0, 2%, 4%). The vertical axis measures the average
innovation rate and the two other axis measure the R&D subsidy and degree
of competition respectively. The degree of competition is measured by letting
π0 increase from 0 to π1.7 This gives an inverted-U shape relationship
between average rate of innovation and competition, just as in the original
AHHV article. We observe that an R&D subsidy accelerates innovation at
all levels of competition. However, as product market competition gets more
intense, the positive eﬀect of an R&D subsidy becomes weaker. This is due
to the fact that the strategic substitutability eﬀect discussed above becomes
stronger. Alternatively, we can argue that when the Schumpeterian eﬀect
starts dominating, the R&D subsidy makes it relatively stronger. This is
implied by the fact higher R&D subsidy makes the inverted-U shape curve
steeper at the high degrees of competition (see Figure 1).
3 The data and measurement issues
We construct our unbalanced panel using data on the ﬁnancing decisions
of Tekes as our base population. We match to this data set ﬁrm level
accounting data and plant-level data on output from the data sets at the
Business Structures Unit (BSU) of Statistics Finland. We further match R&D
expenditures from the R&D panel data of the BSU and patent data from
ad a t aﬁle constructed by combining data drawn from the National Board
of Patents and Registration of Finland (NBPR) and the so-called NBER
patent citations ﬁle (cf Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001)).8 Concentrating on
ﬁrms which have received grants for R&D we expect to screen out the ﬁrms
conducting unsuccessful R&D. This is because we assume that evaluators of
grant applications of the technology agency assess the feasibility of the R&D
projects. Another advantage of using the grant data as the base population is
7The values of the proﬁts should be interpreted as price-cost margin between zero and
ten per cent that is, high on the scale equals 10 per cent price-cost-margin. The values of
subsidy should be intrepreted as percentage of the total R&D expenditures.




































Figure 1: Interaction between competition, R&D subsidy and innovation in
the model.
Note: ρ measures the proportional R&D subsidy in the model.
that we reduce the problem of excess zeros of the dependent variable, the US
patents, since the ﬁrms applying for R&D subsidies are expected to conduct
more R&D than the average ﬁr m .W et r e a tt h eo b s e r v a t i o n sw i t hm o r et h a n5 0
patents per year as outliers and exclude them as well as outliers with respect to
the competition measure. Finally, after excluding the industries without any
US patents during the period of observation our entire sample comprises 3340
observations of 1487 manufacturing companies between the years 1990 and
2001. The ﬁnal sample contains 1514 US patents and 368 positive ﬁrms/year
observations of the dependent variable, that is patent counts.9
3.1 Measuring innovation intensity
Before turning to the empirical analysis it is worth discussing brieﬂyt h e
relevant measurement issues. Following Aghion et al (2005), we use patent
counts as the main indicator of innovative activity. We use information
on patents granted by the United States Patenting Oﬃce (USPTO) and
originating in Finland. We assume that most major Finnish innovations are
patented in the US and thus, many low value patents should be screened out
9We also make use of complete data on patents applied at the Finnish Patents Oﬃce
(Patentti- ja Rekisterihallitus). In our ﬁnal sample there are 693 ﬁrm/years with positive
observations including altogether 3820 patents.
17by focusing on USPTO patents.10
3.2 Measuring the degree of market power and product market
competition
As discussed above, product market reforms are mainly expected to aﬀect
innovation outcomes through the level of rents, or economic proﬁts, in the
market. To capture this we follow Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al (2005) and
use the industry level Lerner index, a well established measure for measuring
ﬁrms’ price-cost margins. Boone (2000) shows that the use of Lerner index
as a measure for competition is preferred to most other commonly used
measures. It is more theoretically robust than particularly those based on
concentration or market shares. We calculate the inverse of the size-weighted
industry level average of the Lerner index using a two-digit SIC code precision
level. The measure takes value 0 for industries where no competition exists
and 1, or larger, indicates perfect competition. Our plant level Lerner index
is calculated as the annual output minus labor, intermediate good, capital
costs and depreciation divided by output.11 The industry level Lerner index is
computed using the entire population of plants within the industry. Following
Aghion et al (2005), we also construct an alternative measure for competition
by removing the eﬀe c to fm a r k e ts h a r eo naﬁrm’s proﬁt margin. Market share
is measured as the ﬁrm’s share of output of the total output produced by ﬁrms
in the same two-digit industry.
3.3 Measuring public funding
In general, any public intervention that aims at removing market imperfections
and creates additionality in research could be considered as a form of R&D
subsidy. However, since our theoretical measure of an R&D subsidy is most
closely related to a direct R&D subsidy that decreases the innovation costs
proportionally, we chose to consider only direct R&D subsidies. We thus use
data on the ﬁnancing decisions of subsidies granted to product development
by the National Technology Agency of Finland (Tekes). More speciﬁcally, we
measure direct R&D funding as Tekes direct subsidies for product development.
Direct R&D subsidies to ﬁrms form the cornerstone of Tekes’ funding (roughly
40% of the total budget of EUR 407.2 million) along with the other type
of direct subsidy, grants for research projects. However, grants for research
projects are mainly directed to universities and research institutes and would
10We run robustifying estimations using patent counts of patents ﬁled at the Finnish
patents oﬃce as the dependent variable and ﬁnd that the results remain qualitatively the
same.
11The annual depreciation rate is set at 15 per cent, the capital stock is calculated using
PIM assuming a 15 per cent depreciation rate and deﬂated to year 2000 prices. We then
inﬂate the measure back to current prices using the implicit price index from the data. We
assume that the capital cost is 5 per cent for all ﬁr m sa c r o s st i m e .
18thus not contribute much to our analysis even if considered.12 We construct
our empirical measure by relating the annually received direct R&D subsidies
to the ﬁrms annual inhouse R&D expenditures.13
3.4 Real life experiments as instruments
The ﬁnal measurement issue concerns a potential endogeneity problem of our
competition measure. One reason for endogeneity is that the variation in the
Lerner index might be mainly caused by the variations in ﬁxed costs. This
could lead to biased relationship between Lerner index and patenting. We
follow Aghion et al (2005) and make use of real life experiments such as the
implementation of the EU Single Market Programme and investigations by
the Finnish competition authority (Kilpailuvirasto) as well as privatizations
of large publicly owned enterprises in 8 two-digit industries to deal with
the endogeneity problem.14 W ee n du pw i t h2 3e x c l u d e di n d u s t r yl e v e l
instruments.
3.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our entire sample of 3340
observations. To begin with, it is ﬁrst easy to see that, as usually when dealing
with count data, our patent count distribution is highly skewed, with the
majority of the ﬁrms taking out no patents in any given year. The mean of the
industry level Lerner index is 0.076, implying that the ﬁrms’ average price-cost
margin is roughly 8 per cent. The average ﬁrm sales per year of roughly 92.2
million EUR against the median of 6.2 million EUR indicates that the data are
severely skewed with respect to ﬁrm size. Also the employment ﬁgures give
an indication of a highly skewed distribution of size of ﬁrms in our sample,
with roughly 376 workers in the average ﬁrm while the median ﬁrm has 53
workers. The average R&D investment for a ﬁrm is roughly EUR 2.8 million
(of which the average fraction conducted internally is 2.5 million), yet there
is wide variation within the sample; the median yearly investment on R&D
almost a tenth of the mean. The average R&D subsidy (ie direct subsidy by
Tekes to industry R&D) is EUR 209 000 and quite naturally, following from the
distribution of R&D expenditures, this ﬁgure is also skewed with the median
yearly subsidy being EUR 70 000. The median of the R&D subsidy over
12Since the founding of Tekes in 1982, its role in the national innovation system has
increased steadily and direct subsidies have become the main form of ﬁnancing. An
increasing part of the funding is directed at SMEs which got roughly 60% of industry funding
in 2001. Tekes can provide SMEs with R&D grants of up to 35% of total project ﬁnance
and R&D loans of up 70% of the predicted costs of a project. These ﬁgures are lower for
large companies, and ﬁnance is granted only on condition of some degree of networking or
other cooperation.
13We consider the the ﬁrm/year observations where zero inhouse R&D expenditures were
reported despite received R&D subsidies as irregularities and exclude them from the analysis.
14See Appendix for a full description of the policy changes used as instruments for the
Lerner index
19inhouse R&D expenditures is roughly 24 percent of a ﬁrm’s in-house R&D
investments. The unusually high mean of this relation is perhaps explained by
t h ef a c tt h a ts o m eﬁrms have been unable to commit themselves to spending
allocated R&D shares reported in grant applications.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean S.E Median
Patents 3340 0.453 2.508 0
Lerner index 3340 0.076 0.052 0.070
Employment 3120 376 1057 53
Sales (1000 EUR) 3120 9220 45500 620
Total R & D expenditures (1000 EUR) 2038 2774 9016 327
Inhouse R & expenditures (1000 EUR) 2037 2468 7520 288
R & D subsidies (1000 EUR) 3340 209 484 70
Relative R & D subsidies 1748 0.56 1.349 0.24
4 Empirical speciﬁcation
Our analysis follows that of Aghion et al (2005) in that we start from a
semiparametric log-linear speciﬁcation. In line with the theory, we assume that
the innovation process, ie our discrete random variable x, is Poisson distributed
with hazard rate x =e x p( g(c)). The expected count of patents p satisﬁes a
relation E[p | c]=e x p ( g(c)) where c is a measure of competition and g is
s o m eu n k n o w nf u n c t i o nt ob es p e c i ﬁed later on. When industry ﬁxed eﬀects,
ηj,a n dt i m ee ﬀects, τt are included to control for diﬀerent permanent levels
of patenting activity and common macroeconomic shocks, the average patent
behavior is related to industry level competition according to




iγ + τt + ηj
¢
(4.1)
where i indexes ﬁrms, j indexes industries and t indexes years. We
control for the ﬁrm speciﬁc time-invariant heterogeneity using pre-sample
patent information following Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1995).
More speciﬁcally, we add a vector xi including the ﬁrm’s pre-sample
patent stock and an indicator for non-zero pre-sample patent values
to proxy for a ﬁrm’s technological knowledge stock. In this case, the
Fixed Eﬀects Poisson Estimator provides a consistent estimator for
the expected number of patents. However, we acknowledge the fact
that our patent counts data are excessively dispersed, as is usually
the case with patent data sets. This leads to an incorrectly estimated
variance-covariance matrix. We calculate the so called GLM standard
errors to obtain the corrected variance-covariance matrix.15 Following
Aghion et al (2005), we ﬁr s te s t i m a t et h em o d e lw h e r eg(c) is approximated
15See Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 19) and Allison and Waterman (2002).
20with a quadratic speciﬁcation.16 The potential endogenity of our competition
measure, the inverse of the Lerner index, is modeled following Wooldridge
(1997), as dependence in the error terms of the form ln( ijt)=θvijt + uijt,
where v is the residual in the ﬁrst stage equation of our competition measure,
the inverse of the Lerner index cjt against the policy instrument zjt, discussed
above. Here uijt is assumed to be independent of vijt and of zjt.E q u a t i o n
(4.1) can then be written as a conditional expectation




iγ + τt + ηj + θvijt−1
¢
(4.2)
Wooldridge (1999) shows that this can be estimated consistently by the
standard ﬁxed-eﬀect Poisson regression of Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984).
Wooldridge (1999) also provides a method for calculating robust standard
errors.17 Note that vijt is not observed, so we must replace it by its predicted
values ˆ vijt from the ﬁrst stage equation.18 We bootstrap the standard errors
in order to remove the bias caused by the use of the prediction of vijt as a
variable in speciﬁcation (4.2). Only if θ =0will cjt be exogenous.
In order to study the interaction between product market competition
and R&D subsidies, we allow the inverted-U relationship to change as the
R&D subsidies are introduced. We add the interaction between competition,
cjt, and the relative R&D subsidies (direct R&D subsidies per inhouse R&D
expenditures), ρ, to the basic quadratic speciﬁc a t i o n . W et h u sa c q u i r ea
speciﬁcation of the form where
E
£
pijt | cjt−1,ρ ijt−1,x ijt−1
¤
(4.3)
=e x p ( α + β1cjt + β2 (cjt−1)
2 + β3ρijt−1 + β4cjt−1ρijt−1
+ β5 (cjt−1)
2 ρijt−1 + x
0
ijt−1γ + τt + ηj).
Here xijt−1 is a vector of ﬁrm covariates that control for other factors that
might aﬀect the innovation performance of ﬁrms. These covariates are the size
of the ﬁrm and the size interacted with a dummy variable which separates ﬁrms
at the median amount of subsidies.The theoretical results deliver clear testable
predictions. The inverted-U shape between competition and innovation imply
that the sign of the coeﬃcient β1 in the quadratic speciﬁcation (4.3) should
be signiﬁcantly positive and that β2 should be signiﬁcantly negative, and that
2 × β2 >β 1, in order to turn the curve into an inverted-U shape within
the range of the Lerner index. Our theoretical results further predict that
β3 should be positive, thus shifting the level of the inverted-U shape upwards
16In an earlier version of the paper (cf Kilponen and Santavirta (2004)), we experimented
with non-parametric methods, such as Kernel estimation and spline estimation, in order
to adopt more ﬂexible functional form. We found evidence of a two peaked relationship
between citation weighted patents and degree of competition, both using a cubic spline and
a Gaussian Kernel regression.
17In practice robust standard errors are obtained by rescaling the variance-covariance
matrix by the square root of the ratio of the sum of squared Pearson residuals to the degrees
of freedom.
18Under the maintained assumption that our 1st stage regression is correctly speciﬁed,
the estimated values of ˆ vijt c a nb eu s e di np l a c eo fvijt. This is because plimT→∞ˆ vijt =
vijt. Although the use of these regressors does not aﬀect consistency, the standard errors
need to be corrected. We apply the bootstrapping method.
21when R&D subsidies are increased. The coeﬃcient of the quadratic interaction
term β5 should be negative in order to steepen the inverted-U relationship
when competition becomes more intense. The strength of the latter eﬀect also
depends on the coeﬃcient of the linear interaction term β4, which, relative to
β5, should not be too large in absolute terms.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 The inverted-U relationship
The estimation results from the quadratic speciﬁcation of Aghion et al (2005)
model are presented in Table 2. In general, these ﬁndings provide mixed
evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation.
I nc o l u m nI ,w h e r ew ee s t i m a t et h es t a n d a r dﬁxed eﬀects Poisson regression
without controlling for possible endogeneity of competition, the estimated
coeﬃcient for the inverse of Lerner index cjt−1 is insigniﬁcant. The same
applies for the squared term c2
jt−1. Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcient
of c2
jt−1 is not large enough to turn the function into an inverted U-shape.
After controlling for endogeneity, the results are somewhat more promising
(column II). In column II, we present the results from the estimation similar
to speciﬁcation in column I, but treating the inverse of the Lerner index as
endogenous.19 The estimation is based on the control function approach. In
other words, we estimate two reduced form equations, one for cjt−1 and one
for c2
jt−1, and use the prediction of the residuals from these regressions as a
control function in the second stage regression. The statistics of the reduced
form regressions are provided in the lower part of Table 2. The estimated
coeﬃcients suggests now that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between
innovations and competition. However, the coeﬃcients for cjt−1 and c2
jt−1 turn
out to be imprecisely estimated, although we control for ﬁrm size and ﬁrm
speciﬁc heterogeneity.
19The results do not change qualitatively when the eﬀect of the market share is removed
from this measure.
22Table 2: The basic exponential quadratic speciﬁcation
Dependent variable: Patent countsijt








patent stocki, pre-sample 0.072 0.068
(0.014) (0.014)
D(patent stocki, pre-sample > 0) 1.362 1.710
(0.249) (0.236)
First stage equations:
cjt : R2( 1 0.224
F(2 5.10(22)∗∗∗
c2





number of observations 1271 1510
Notes: The sample consists of 3340 observations of manufacturing ﬁrms in industries
with patenting activity between years 1990 and 2001. In Column I we report the Fixed-eﬀects
Poisson regression, while in column II we report the results where we control for potential
endogeneity of cjt−1 using a control function approach. The standard errors reported in
brackets are Wooldridge (1999) distribution- and heteroscedasticity robust. In column II
the standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications. 1) The partial R2 for the
excluded instrument in the reduced form regression. 2) The joint signiﬁcance test of excluded
instruments. The superscript *** implies that the P-value of the F test is < 0.01. 3) F test
of joint signiﬁcance of competition and competition. The superscript *** (**) in the table
implies that the P-value of the F test is < 0.01 (0.05).
5.2 Interaction between product market competition,
innovation and R&D subsidies
In this section we discuss the estimation results where we control for the
possible interaction between competition and R&D subsidies. As discussed
above, this is done by including interaction terms in the conditional mean
function of innovations (see equation 4.3). The results are summarised in
Table 3.
23Table 3: Exponential quadratic speciﬁcation: R&D subsidies
Dependent variable: Patent countsijt










cjt−1 × ρijt−1 -10.601 -26.806
(5.504) (21.703)
c2
jt−1 × ρijt−1 -0.070 -0.159
(0.182) (0.699)
patent stocki, pre-sample -0.001 0.08
(0.014) (0.037)
D(patent stocki, pre-sample > 0) 1.02 0.938
(0.222) (0.537)
log salesijt−1 0.692 0.673
(0.060) (0.109)
log salesijt−1×D(ρijt>median) -1.577 -1.521
(0.624) (1.475)
χ2, exogeneity of cjt−1,c 2
jt−1,
cjt × ρijt−1 and c2
jt × ρijt : 3.51(4)
First stage equations:
cjt−1 : R2 1) 0.150
F 2) 36.56(20)∗∗∗
c2
jt−1 : R2 0.169
F 41.78(20)∗∗∗
cjt−1 × ρijt−1 : R2 0.016
F 4.26(20)∗∗∗
c2




F-test 3) 21.40∗∗∗ 2.78
number of observations 854 835
Notes: The sample consists of 1739 observations of manufacturing ﬁrms in industries
with patenting activity between years 1990 and 2001. In column I we reports the
Fixed-eﬀects Poisson regression, while in column II we report the results where we control
for potential endogeneity of cjt−1 using a control function approach. The standard errors
reported in brackets are Wooldridge (1999) distribution- and heteroscedasticity robust. In
column II the standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications. 1) The partial R2for
the excluded instrument in the reduced form regression. 2) The joint signiﬁcance test of
excluded instruments. 3) F test for the joint signiﬁcance of competition. The superscript
*** (**) in the table implies that the P-value of the F test is < 0.01 (0.05).
24In column I we show the results of the Fixed-Eﬀects Poisson estimation.
An inverted-U shape is obtained with the coeﬃcients for cjt−1 and c2
jt−1 both
being highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of R&D subsidies is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that an R&D subsidy per se
has a positive eﬀect on patenting activity. The coeﬃcient of linear interaction
term cjt−1ρijt−1 is negative, but signiﬁcant only at 10 percent level. There is
thus weak evidence that R&D subsidies steepen the inverted-U shape between
competition and innovation at high degrees of competition. The coeﬃcient of
the quadratic interaction term c2
jt−1ρijt−1 is also negative as predicted by the
theory. However, this coeﬃcient is rather imprecisely estimated.
In column II we add a control function similar to the one in the basic
quadratic estimation (see column II of Table 2). Since the interaction
terms could also be endogenous, we run four ﬁrst stage regressions using the
policy instrument discussed in section (3.4). The statistics of the ﬁrst stage
regressions are provided in the lower part of Table 3 conﬁrming the validity
of the instruments. In the second stage regression, we obtain an inverted-U
shape between competition and innovation although the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients of cjt−1 and c2
jt−1 exceed the 10 per cent level. The interaction
terms are no longer signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients have the same signs as in
the basic ﬁxed-eﬀect Poisson case of column I.
Two features stand out clearly from columns I and II in Table 3. First,
ﬁrms receiving more R&D subsidies show a higher level of innovation activity
for any level of competition except for nearly perfect competition. Second,
the results provide at least weak evidence that the inverted-U shape becomes
steeper when R&D subsidies are increased.20
Perhaps the most illustrative way to compare our empirical ﬁndings with
the theoretical results is to simulate the estimated relationship between
innovation and competition. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure
2 ,w h e r ew es i m u l a t et h ee s t i m a t e dm o d e l ,ﬁrst at the median level of R&D
subsidies, and then inducing a 10 and 20 per cent increase to the level of
subsidies. We let the inverse of the Lerner index to vary roughly between 0.7
and 1. The simulated model is based on the estimation results shown in column
II of Table 3. From Figure 2 we can see, that the Schumpeterian eﬀect is indeed
stronger at high levels of product market competition, ie when (1-Lerner) index
approaches one on the horizontal axis. There is some weak evidence that
a negative cross-eﬀect of innovations and competition leads eventually into
counteracting eﬀect of the R&D subsidy on innovative eﬀort. Finally, contrary
to the theoretical results, the simulation suggests that increasing the level of
R&D subsidies does not stimulate the innovative activity at low degrees of
competition equally much as at moderate degrees.
20When using data on domestic patents we obtain similar results. The following
coeﬃcients (standard errors) for cjt−1, c2
jt−1, cjt−1×ρijt−1 and c2
jt−1×ρijt−1 were obtained:
48.519 (27.395), -24.818 (15.181), -2.901 (7.435) and 0.133 (0.109) respectively.














































Figure 2: Simulation of inverted U-shape using the estimated coeﬃcients of
instrumental variable estimation.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The modern Schumpeterian growth theory predicts that more intense
competition increases the ﬁrms innovative activities, at least up to a certain
level. A proportional R&D subsidy, which decreases the costs of innovating,
also accelerates innovations, but this eﬀect is smaller when competition
is ﬁerce. In other words, the proportional R&D subsidy reinforces the
Schumpeterian eﬀect of innovation. Our empirical results are in general
compatible with these views. Using the ﬁrm and plant level data on patenting
activity, product market competition and R&D subsidies for Finnish ﬁrms, we
ﬁnd support for an inverted-U shape relationship between patenting activity
of the ﬁrms and the degree of competition. We also ﬁnd some evidence
t h a tR & Ds u b s i d i e si n c r e a s ei n n o v a t i v ee ﬀort at medium level of competition.
This eﬀect becomes smaller when competition becomes more intense. In fact,
a negative cross-eﬀect of innovations and competition leads eventually into
counteracting eﬀect of the R&D subsidy on innovative eﬀo r ta tv e r yh i g hl e v e l s
of competition.
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Policy instrument
We follow Aghion et al (2005) and use three types of exogenous policy
instruments: the implementation of the EU Single Market Programme (SMP),
investigations by the Finnish Competition Authority (Kilpailuvirasto), and
major privatizations. The aims of the SMP were to remove internal barriers
in the EU in order to achieve the free movement of goods, services, capital
and labor. The European Commission’s White Paper (1985) outlined around
three hundred speciﬁc measures which were designed to implement the SMP.
The measures that were aimed at promoting competition include instituting
common rules on regulation, takeovers, state assistance to industry, patents
and copyrights, company accounting and disclosure of information, opening
up of public procurement to competitive tender and reducing intervention in
agriculture. The, so called, Cecchini report attempts to measure the size
of non-tariﬀ barriers existing before the SMP. They use a series of surveys
and technical papers to assign numerical values to the size of non-tariﬀ
barriers in each industry before the SMP. Mayes and Hart (1994) classify the
industries that were ex ante expected to be strongly or moderately aﬀected
by the implementation into 41 3-digit industries. The initial SMP programme
was announced in 1986 and the implementation was scheduled to take place
between 1988 and 1992. For countries such as Finland, that joined EU in 1995,
division into pre- and postimplementation periods is all but self evident. We
use here 1993 as the ﬁrst post-implementation year, arguing that Finland as
a candidate country participated in the ETA negotiations between 1990—1992.
The Finnish competition authority undertakes the case-by-case investigations
of potential distortions of competition, increasing prices or reducing consumer’s
choice. In cases where the competition authority ﬁnds that this is the case,
some remedial action is recommended. We use information on all cases in
manufacturing industries betweeen 1988—2002. The complete list of cases
including case numbers is supplied by the authors on request. We additionally
use information on major Finnish privatizations of publicly owned companies
in 8 two-digit manufacturing industries. We codify the privatization to aﬀect
all ﬁrms in the respective industry. A list of the privatizations are available
from the authors upon request.
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